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UNION DUES CHECKOFF AS A SUBJECT IN LABOR.
MANAGEMENT NEGOTIATIONS: GOOD FAITH
BARGAINING AND NLRB REMEDIES
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in 1898 with the passage of the Erdman Act,1 government endorse-
ment of the principle of collective bargaining indicated that the modem concept
of industrial relations was to be one of joint participation by both manage-
ment and labor in the determination of wages, hours, and working conditions.2
Because of the refusal of employers to alter their previous policy of refusing
to recognize unionism and because of the failure of previous legislation,4
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (Wagner Act)
which "put the power of the federal government behind the union orga-
nizer .... -" With the tremendous growth and strengthening of the labor move-
ment in America after 19357 Congress began to fear that the labor movement
was becoming too powerful,8 and in 1947 amended the Wagner Act by passing
the Taft-Hartley Act.9 This act, for the first time, proscribed certain union
conduct as being unfair labor practices.10 However, the policy of the United
1. Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424. This Act made it a misdemeanor to
discriminate against union activity on the railroads. Id. § 10, at 428. The Act was later
repealed, Act of July 15, 1913, ch. 6, § 10, 38 Stat. 103, but laid the groundwork for
later railway legislation such as the Railway Labor Act of 1926. [Act of May 20, 1926,
ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (codified at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-64 (1964) )].
2. G. Bloom & H. Northrup, Economics of Labor Relations 749 (Sth ed. 1965) [herein-
after cited as Bloom & Northrup]. See generally Farmer, The Taft-Hartley Act and the
Balance of Power in Labor Relations, 51 W. Va. L.Q. 141 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Farmer].
3. Bloom & Northrup 749; see Farmer 145.
4. Bloom & Northrup 750. Neither the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932 [Act of Mrch 23,
1932, 47 Stat. 70 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1964))] nor the National Industrial Re-
covery Act (Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195) provided adequate remedies.
5. Act of July 5, 1935, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-81
(1964)).
6. Bloom & Northrup 750; see Farmer 146.
7. Bloom & Northrup 757; see Farmer 146.
8. H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 3-5 (1947); see Farmer 147.
9. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-66 (1964))
(amendment to National Labor Relations Act).
10. Labor Management Relations Act § 8(b) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1964)).
"The attitude of government toward collective bargaining by employees had passed through
a succession of stages from active hostility in the early 1800's, when labor organizations
were prosecuted as conspiracies, to active encouragement of union organization under the
Wagner Act. Enactment of the Taft-Hartley law represented a new stage in government
treatment of both management and labor.' Bloom & Northrup 758. The purpose of the
Taft-Hartley Act was basically to correct the "imbalance" that had developed in labor
management relations. Crowley, The Regulation of Organizational and Recognitional Picket-
ing Under Section 8(b) (7) of the National Labor Relations Act, 47 Marq. L. Rev. 295
(1964).
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States as enunciated in the Wagner Act remained the same-to achieve indus-
trial peace through the process of collective bargaining.11
Collective bargaining is defined in the National Labor Relations Act in section
8(d) as "the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the
representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good
faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ-
ment. .... ,,12 Refusal of an employer to bargain collectively is an unfair labor
practice under section 8 (a) (5).'8
Dues checkoff is the deduction from an employee's paycheck made by man-
agement for the purpose of paying the employee's union dues.14 The union
is thus presented with one check by the employer which covers the dues for
all the employees in the bargaining unit and is saved the trouble of soliciting
from each of its members. Problems often arise in the course of negotiations
when an employer evinces an intention not to grant the union a dues checkoff
privilege. First, is dues checkoff a subject which must be bargained for if the
union so demands? Second, if it must be bargained for, what is the good faith
required of an employer who refuses to grant the privilege? Third, what are
the remedies for a bad faith refusal?
II. DuEs CHECKOF AS A MANDATORY SUBJECT
The National Labor Relations Act provides that the parties meet and confer
on wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 15 This is not
to say, however, that they must negotiate everything which a union might
desire. Yet, at the same time, for negotiations to be an effective and meaningful
experience for both management and labor, certain subjects have to be bar-
gained for. The courts have distinguished between these mandatory subjects 1P-
those which must be discussed-and voluntary subjects17-those which may be
discussed at the discretion of the parties.
The Supreme Court explained the different duties required of parties in bar-
gaining for mandatory and voluntary subjects in NLRB v. Wooster Division
of Borg-Warner Corp.18 There the Court ruled that a party must bargain for
a mandatory subject but "[tlhe duty is limited to those subjects, and within
11. National Labor Relations Act § 1(b) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (1964)) ; see
NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402-03 (1952); United States Steel Corp. v.
Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 950 (1956).
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). It should be noted that "such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession .... " Id.
13. Id. § 158(a) (5). Such a refusal is also an unfair labor practice for the union under
§ 8(b)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(3) (1964).
14. Black's Law Dictionary 301 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
15. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
16. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Wooster
Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
17. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964); NLRB v. Davison,
318 F.2d 550 (4th Cir. 1963).
18. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
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that area neither party is legally obligated to yield.", ° However, as to voluntary
subjects, each side "is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not
to agree."20 The Court gave some guidelines as to what a mandatory subject
is in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB. 2 1 There the Court looked to
the basic purposes of the Act when it said a mandatory subject was one which
"would promote the fundamental purpose of the Act by bringing a problem of
vital concern to labor and management within the framework established by
Congress as most conducive to industrial peace."2-s Still, these guidelines are
just that-guidelines-and do not give much assistance when specific subjects
are examined.
In determining whether a subject is mandatory, a logical starting point is the
wording of the statute itself. Wages and hours are explicitly stated to be such
and these terms are sufficiently specific as not to give rise to interpretation
problems2 4 Thus, what a person is to be paid and how long he is to work must
be discussed during the course of collective bargaining. What constitutes "other
terms and conditions of employment" presents a more difficult problem. Justice
Stewart, concurring in Fibreboard,-5 said, "In common parlance, the conditions
of a person's employment are most obviously the various physical dimensions of
his working environment . . . . There are [however] other less tangible
but no less important characteristics of a person's employment which might also
be deemed 'conditions' ... J326
The circuit courts have done little to elucidate the answer. The First Circuit
has held that, "any matter which might in the future emerge as a bone of
contention" 27 is a mandatory bargaining subject.e The Fifth Circuit, interpret-
19. Id. at 349.
20. Id.
21. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
22. Id. at 211. The Court added that it would be appropriate to look at industrial
bargaining practices. Id.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). "[To bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.. . ." Id.
24. However, in NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713 (2d Cir. 1952), there
was a controversy whether Christmas bonuses were wages.
25. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
26. Id. at 222. Justice Stewart also noted that the words of the Act are words of
limitation and that "the specification of wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of
employment defines a limited category of issues subject to compulsory bargaining." Id. at
220. Justice Stewart cited from the legislative history of the 1947 Act, H.R. 3020, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., § 2(11) (B) (vi) (1947).
27. W.W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875, 878 (1st Cir. 1949) (group insurance
program held to be a mandatory subject).
28. Matters which have been held to be mandatory subjects include wages or rates of
pay, NLRB v. H.E. Fletcher Co., 298 F.2d 594 (1st Cir. 1962), hours of employment,
NLRB v. Swift & Co., 127 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1942), and provisions relating to union
security, NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F.2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 827
1970]
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ing Borg-Warner,29 based its determination on "whether the subject matter
would settle any term or condition of employment, or would regulate the rela-
tions between the employer and employees. '30 Conversely, the Fourth Circuit
has held that "matters which lie within the province of management" need not
be bargained for.3' Similarly, the Third Circuit has held, "The words used by
Congress in [section 8(d)] are broad and in each case the interests of the em-
ployees and the purpose of the National Labor Relations Act in securing in-
dustrial tranquility must be carefully balanced against the right of an employer
to run his business." 32 The Fourth Circuit has also recognized a distinction
between "those subjects which have a material or significant impact upon wages,
hours, or other conditions of employment, and those which are only indirectly,
incidentally, or remotely related to those subjects.1 33 Stating that the con-
gressional intent was not to embrace everything under section 8(d), the Fourth
Circuit said, "The statutory purpose may best be served by formulating and
applying a reasonable concept of 'conditions of employment' in determining
subjects of mandatory bargaining." 34
All these proposed tests are necessarily vague and only designed as guides,
with definite mandatory subjects being determined only on a case by case
approach. However, when a subject has been determined to be a mandatory one,
it is agreed that it may be bargained to an impasse so long as the bargaining is in
good faith.35 At the same time, if the company refuses to discuss a voluntary
subject, the union cannot insist on the discussion of such to the extent that
negotiations are delayed or disrupted.3 0
Whether the subject of dues checkoff is a "condition of employment" under
the Act and thus a mandatory subject of bargaining has often been before the
National Labor Relations Board and the courts. 37 The National Labor Rela-
(1949), and a union shop, NLRB v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F.2d 144, 154 (7th
Cir. 1951).
29. 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
30. NLRB v. Houston Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors of America, Inc., 349 F.2d
449, 452 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966).
31. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 224 F.2d 869, 874 (4th Cir. 1955), rev'd on other grounds,
351 U.S. 149 (1956). There appears to be no answer as to what all of management's
prerogatives are. Thus the basic problem arises.
32. NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d 191, 195 (3rd Cir. 1965).
33. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 547 (4th Cir. 1967).
34. Id. at 550.
35. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1958); H.K.
Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1372 (1965), enforced sub nom. United Steelworkers v.
NLRB, 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 851 (1966), motion for clarification
granted, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967), supplemented sub nom. H.K. Porter Co., 172
N.L.R.B. No. 72 (July 3, 1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969), rev'd on other
grounds, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
36. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. NLRB, 277 F.2d 681, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
cf. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
37. Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB, 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945); Stevenson Brick & Block
Co., 160 N.L.R.B. 198, 210 (1966), modified, 393 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1968); Bethlehem
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tions Board (NLRB)3 8 is given a great deal of flexibility in interpreting the
Act39 in order to effectuate its policies as evidenced by congressional intent and
the courts will normally interfere only if the Board abuses its discretionary
power4 0 The Board feels dues checkoff does qualify under the Act as a manda-
tory subject. In Bethlehem Steel Co.41 the Board held, "[W]e find that . . .
checkoff... [is a matter] related to 'wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment' within the meaning of Section 8(d) of the Act and, there-
fore, [is a] mandatory subject for collective bargaining."-''
There is, however, some division in the courts. In Hughes Tool Co. v. NLRB 43
the Fifth Circuit held that checkoff was not covered by the Act and thus was
"not in its nature a matter for collective bargaining."4 4 A later First Circuit
case held that it was a "proper subject" although the court did not determine
whether this meant it was properly mandatory or properly voluntary.45 How-
ever, recent decisions have agreed with the reasoning of the National Labor
Relations Board in Bethlehem Steel.40 In Caroline Farms Division of Textron,
Inc. v. NLRB 47 the Fourth Circuit recognized that checkoff was a mandatory
subject and emphasized this fact by saying, "An employers refusal to negotiate
in fact-to meet and confer-on this issue violates the Act even without a
Steel Co, 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615
(3rd Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964). See also Caroline Farms Div. of Textron,
Inc. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1968); United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge
Works) v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968) (because of
the possible confusion with the case next cited, the company involved will be indicated
parenthetically throughout in both text and footnotes); United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter
Co.) v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35
supra); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.2d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 Us.
887 (1953); Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc., 160 N.L.R.B. 175 (1966), enforced, 390
F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); E.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370
(1965) (for subsequent history see note 35 supra).
38. The Board was created by the 1935 Act to administer the NLRA. Act of July S,
1935, ch. 372, § 3(a), 49 Stat. 449,451 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1964)) (Wagner Act).
39. NLRB v. Enid Co-op. Creamery Ass'n, 169 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1948).
40. NLRB v. WGOK, Inc., 384 F.2d 500 (Sth Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Teamsters Local 777,
340 F.2d 905 (7th Cir. 1964); N LRB v. Cooke & Jones, Inc., 339 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1964).
41. 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3d
Cir. 1963).
42. Id. at 1502; see Stevenson Brick & Block Co., 160 N.L.IB. 198, 210 (1966),
modified, 393 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1968). See also Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc., 160
N.L.R.B. 175 (1966), enforced, 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 US. 904 (1968).
43. 147 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1945).
44. Id. at 74.
45. NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F.d 131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S.
887 (1953). The wording of the court was: "On the check-off proposal, the Company
registered its opposition, mainly on the ground that this was not a proper subject of col-
lective bargaining. In this the Company was mistaken." Id. at 136.
46. 136 N.L.R.B. 1500 (1962), enforcement denied on other grounds, 320 F.2d 615 (3rd
Cir. 1963).
47. 401 F.2d 205 (4th Cir. 1968).
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general failure of subjective good faith." 48 Thus, an employer who sincerely
desires to reach an agreement with his employees' representatives would nonethe-
less violate the Act if he would not discuss the checkoff of dues. Checkoff has
also been recognized as a mandatory subject in the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit.4 9 Recent decisions by both the NLRB and the courts, then, establish
checkoff as a mandatory subject, the Hughes Tool case to the contrary. 0 If it is
assumed that checkoff is a mandatory subject then an employer must meet and
confer in good faith regarding it. What constitutes good faith in this area
presents perhaps a more difficult problem.
III. GooD FAIr AND DuEs CHE0xorP
A. Background
Any definition of good faith necessarily includes ideals of sincerity, candor,
and fairness-qualities which may be somewhat utopian at the often acrimonious
bargaining table. 1 Indeed, the facts of a particular case can be such as to make
a determination of good faith a near impossible task. 2 Still, a standard must
exist, however, from which the decision-makers can draw inferences. Good
faith has thus been defined as "an honest and sincere intent and purpose to
explore all the possibilities of settlement of the matters in dispute, until the
exhaustion of all reasonable efforts and the arrival at a point where a definite
decision is reached." 53 The NLRB has required a "serious intent to reach
ultimate agreement on an acceptable common ground.154 The courts also put
much weight on the subjective intentions of the parties and require a serious
intent to reach an agreement. 5 Depending on the court, varying degrees of
honesty, sincerity, frankness, and even amity are required, 8 but at the heart of
48. Id. at 210.
49. United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works) v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846, 849
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968). See also Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 211 (1964); NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 408
(1952); United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 363 F.2d 272, 274 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra).
50. While not directly overruled, the Hughes Tool case has not been followed since it
was decided in 1945 and seems to be out of line with the more recent decisions. See notes 46-
49 supra and accompanying text.
51. See United Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 150, 157 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
52. See United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works) v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846,
851 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
53. 31 Am. Jur. Labor § 268, at 602 (1958).
54. H.K. Porter Co., 153 N.L.R.B. 1370, 1372 (1965) (for subsequent history see note 35
supra).
55. NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822 (5th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Generac Corp.,
354 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. H.E. Fletcher Co., 298 F.2d 594 (1st CIr. 1962);
Texas Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1954); Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB,
119 F.2d 131 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); NLRB v. Reed & Prince
Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); Wilson & Co. v. NLRB,
115 F.2d 759 (8th Cir. 1940).
56. NLRB v. Generac Corp., 354 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Wonder State
Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210, 215-16 (8th Cir. 1965) ; NLRB v. Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d
[Vol. 39
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every opinion and the Act itself is the desire to have the two sides reach agree-
ment in a peaceful atmosphere.
Dues checkoff, of course, is only a small part of the totality of a negotiating
session. Yet, at times it can be a life or death issue for a union short of funds and
in an unfavorable position for collecting its dues.57 The presentation of one large
check representing the sum of its members' dues is a great asset to a union which
would otherwise have to seek out its members individually for payment.5s At
the same time, an employer need not have any great love for the union with
which he is dealing59 and may dislike the idea of "aiding" the union. It is an
integral part of the Act that the parties do not have to reach an agreement as
long as a good faith effort is made.6°
The problems present in this area were brought out by the District of
Columbia Circuit in United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works) v.
NLRB.61 In that case the union had gained a majority of the workers and had
become the bargaining representative in 1951.G2 At that time the company
rejected a checkoff and eventually the union lost its majority. Another union
became the bargaining representative in 1961 and was granted a checkoff
privilege but also lost its majority status. In 1964, the original union regained
a majority but the company refused to grant checkoff privileges as a matter of
"principle." The company, in fact, did have a serious intent to reach an overall
agreement but was adamant on the subject of dues checkoff. The court affirmed
the finding of an unfair labor practice, quoting with approval the Board's
language: "if a party at the bargaining table espouses a position for the purpose
of destroying or even crippling the other party to the negotiations, he has not
bargained in good faith as required by the Act."03 The court agreed that the
Act did not compel agreement but found that the employer was not "hard
bargaining" but was in fact acting in bad faith. Holding that this bad faith
negated the company's overall intent to reach an agreement, the court stated
"it is equally dear that a company... may not assume an intransigent position
in bad faith on a mandatory subject of bargaining even though its purpose to
729, 731 (1st Cir. 1964); NLRB v. H.E. Fletcher Co., 298 F.2d 594, 602 (Ist Cir. 1962);
Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941);
Reed & Prince Mifg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 US. 595 (1941);
Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759, 764 (8th Cir. 1940).
57. See United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 389 Fad 295, 302 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra).
58. Note, however, that a security agreement allowed under the second proviso (part B)
of § 8(a) (3) may effectuate the same goal. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964).
59. Metal Processors' Local 16 v. NLRB, 337 F.2d 114, 117 (D.C. Cir. 1964). See also
United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 363 F2d 272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1966)
(dissenting opinion) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra).
60. 29 US.C. § 158(d) (1964).
61. 390 F2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
62. See 29 US.C. § 159(a) (1964). "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for
such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit...."
Id.
63. 390 F.2d at 849.
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frustrate an agreement on that issue coincides with a willingness to reach some
overall agreement. '64 The key to the court's decision seemed to be the
employer's motive behind its adamant stand. It agreed that the avoidance of
agreement on one issue is not necessarily bad faith5 but that the facts of each
case must be assessed in the light of the statutory purpose. Thus, "[e]ntering
or conducting negotiations with the intent to destroy the other party would
appear to be the archetypal example of a violation of the requirement that the
parties must act in good faith." 60 Merely putting the subject of checkoff
on the bargaining agenda and dismissing it as a matter of principle did not
satisfy the good faith requirement. 7
From this case arise some crucial questions. First, to what degree may an
employer be adamant about a bargaining subject? Second, can this stand be a
whimsical and unreasonable one? Third, to what extent do subjective intentions
influence a determination of good faith? And fourth, what can the Board and
the courts do to remedy the recalcitrant employer bent on destroying a union or
frustrating an agreement by means of an unreasonably adamant bargaining
stand?
B. Firmness on a Mandatory Bargaining Subject
To be adamant on an issue such as dues checkoff puts an employer in a
somewhat hazardous position, for in this area the employer is confronted with
conflicting policies of the Act. On the one hand he is not required to agree to
any specific term and on the other hand he is required to bargain in good
faith.6 The NLRB itself seems to be unsure of which policy it supports. The
64. Id. (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 850.
66. Id. at 851 (emphasis added).
67. Judge Burger dissented from the court's finding of bad faith. In particular he
objected to the finding of overall bad faith because of the adamant refusal to accept a
single proposal. Id. at 853 (dissenting opinion). The majority had based its reasoning on
NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), but Judge Burger pointed out that Katz was a ease
of refusing to meet and confer, not of unreasonableness of position. 390 F.2d at 854. He
also disagreed with the court's reliance on the company's motive to harm when he said,
"An employer with all his employees on strike is 'harmed' much more severely than a union
without a dues checkoff." Id. at 857. Judge Burger pictured the management-union
confrontation as "more a practical-even brutal-economic confrontation than a states-
manlike minuet." Id. He was reluctant to allow the "harm" element alone to determine
bad faith when it was entirely possible that the refusal of checkoff could have been a
bargaining tactic. Because the company had no business reason for refusing checkoff
should not alone have been the determining factor. Id. at 856-57. The majority was In
accord with this reasoning as evidenced by note 11 at 852, which reads, "The fact that the
Board considered the absence of business purpose as an evidentiary indication negativing
good faith in the circumstances of this case is not to be taken as a ruling that business
purposes are the only watchword for good faith." See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397
U.S. 99, 110 (1970) (dissenting opinion).
68. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). The courts have noted the conflict in this area.
See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960); United Steelworkers
(H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (for prior and subsequent
history see note 35 supra).
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Board seems to uphold an employer's right to be adamant on a subject provided
his overall bargaining attitude is one of good faith.69 However, in determining
whether a company has bargained in good faith, the Board has been inconsis-
tent in its judgments. In American Sanitary Wipers Co.70 the employer in-
formed the union that he would not agree to any increase in wages nor to any
change in his policy of refusing to grant paid vacations. This was not due to
economic hardship or impossibility since he was financially able to grant these
proposals, but because he felt his wages and benefits were adequate for the work
performed. He also refused a dues checkoff because it was a union matter.71
In fact, the employer would not agree to anything that would alter the situation
which existed before the union gained a majority. Still, the Board upheld
such firmness as not disproving an honest intention of reaching agreement. 72
In Peter Satori Co.7 3 the Board found that there was an intent to avoid the
reaching of an agreement because the employer "coupled a determination to
yield nothing of substance to the Union with an attitude of offering its proposals
on a take it-or-leave-it basis."74 In both cases the Board's reasoning was
consistent in that it centered around whether the employer's firmness was
intended to frustrate agreement. However, what constituted bad faith in the
Satori case seems to be the very attitude which was condoned in the Amcrican
Sanitary Wipers case and one is still unsure of the status given an adamant
employer. Thus, while the Board seems to have no problem in reconciling the
conflict in the Act in the reasoning it uses, it most certainly has encountered
difficulty when applying this reasoning to the facts of an individual case.
The courts also have been troubled by the conflict in the Act between
freedom of contract and the requirement to bargain in good faith. The objective
which is sought by both the Board and the courts is to support firmness as long
as it is "good faith" firmness. NLRB v. Herman Sausage CoW 5 summarizes
this point in holding: "Deep conviction, firmly held and from which no with-
drawal will be made, may be more than the traditional opening gambit of a
labor controversy. It may be both the right of the citizen and essential to our
69. Webster Outdoor Advertising Co., 170 N.L.R.B. No. 144 (April 12, 1968); Cone
Mills Corp., 169 NL.R.B. No. 59 (Jan. 30, 1968), modified, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1970); American Oil Co., 164 N.L.R.B. 36 (1967). See also
Flowers Baking Co., 169 N.L.RB. No. 101 (Feb. 20, 1968), enforced, 418 F.2d 244 (Sth Cir.
1969); Billups W. Petroleum Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 147 (Feb. 19, 1968), enforced, 416 Fad
1333 (5th Cir. 1969); Palm Beach Woodwork Co., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (Jan. 19, 1968).
70. 157 N.L.R.B. 1092 (1966).
71. See also, Jeffrey Stone Co., 173 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (Sept. 27, 1968) where the employer
had expressed a willingness to grant checkoff but the Board said, "Even in the absence of
such a concession, the employer did not violate the Act by taking an adamant stand on
the issue, since the employer's reason was that it was unwilling to perform clerical services
for the union . .. ." 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 20,209, at 25,367. But see Farmers Co-op.
Gin Ass'n, 161 N.L!B. 887 (1966).
72. In doing so the Board overturned the Trial E.xaminer's decision.
73. 175 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (March 25, 1969).
74. 1969 CCH NLRB Dec. 1J 20,664, at 26,091.
75. 275 Fad 229 (5th Cir. 1960).
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economic legal system, thus far maintained, of free collective bargaining 70
Often the courts talk of an employer's duty to bargain with an open mind and
that good faith cannot connote a stubborn attitude.77 But just as often the right
to insist on a bargaining position is upheld.78 Justice Frankfurter, concurring
in part in NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co.70 expressed this idea when he said
that good faith "is not necessarily incompatible with stubbornness or even with
what to an outsider may seem unreasonableness. 80
It appears, then, that an employer may be adamant on a subject, but such
firmness must be in good faith. Thus, to speak of the right of an employer to be
adamant has no value apart from the concept of good faith. One must look be-
yond the adamant position to the reasons behind it.
C. Justification for Firm Bargaining Positions
The Board and courts are suspicious of totally adamant stands without justi-
fication and thus require that there be reasons behind adament positions in
order to satisfy the good faith requirement.81 The reason behind this require-
ment of justification is the difficulty in determining when an employer is at-
tempting to foil the bargaining process.
The United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.)82 case raised
the possibility of using a business reason criterion, i.e., whether the company's
refusal could be supported as a sound business decision, in determining whether
bargaining has been in good faith.83 This, being a reason which could be easily
76. Id. at 231. Accord, NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 80 (5th Cir. 1965)
("To require bargaining is not to require a bargain.").
77. NLRB v. Generac Corp., 354 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1965); see NLRB v. American
Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952); Singer Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 134
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d
874, 885 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); NLRB v. Express Publ. Co., 111
F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1940), rev'd on other grounds, 312 U.S. 426 (1941).
78. NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952); NLRB v. Almelda
Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir. 1964); Texas Foundries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211
F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir. 1941),
rev'd on other grounds, 314 U.S. 512 (1942).
79. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
80. Id. at 154-55. But see NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 965 (1970), where the company's "take-it-or-leave-it" position at
the beginning of negotiations was found to be an unfair labor practice. Accord, Peter Satori
Co., 175 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (March 25, 1969).
81. E.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 110 (1970) (dissenting opinion) (any
business consideration or any consideration of bargaining strategy); Alba-Waldenslan, Inc.,
167 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1967), enforced, 404 F.2d 1370 (4th Cir. 1968) (positions must be
justified by "reasoned discussions"); ITT Henze Valve Serv., 166 N.L.R.B. 592, 598 (1967)
(explanation for positions required). But cf. Cone Mills Corp., 169 N.L.R.B. No. 59
(Jan. 30, 1968), modified, 413 F.2d 445 (4th Cir. 1969) (adamant stand with vague
and specious reasons deemed "hard bargaining").
82. 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968).
83. United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295 (D.C. Cir. 1967)
(for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra) ; Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.,
160 N.L.R.B. 175, 181 (1966), enforced, 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
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substantiated, would make the determination of good faith that much easier.
However Judge Burger, in his dissent,8 4 pointed out that there are more reasons
than purely business ones for such a refusal. These other reasons are intrinsically
tied to the concept of economic power. Judge Burger's view of labor-manage-
ment relations was voiced several years earlier by the Supreme Court in NLRB
v. Insurance Agents' International Union.85 Here the Court said:
The parties-even granting the modification of views that may come from a realization
of economic interdependence-still proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic
viewpoints and concepts of self-interest. The system has not reached the ideal of the
philosophic notion that perfect understanding among people would lead to perfect
agreement among them on values. The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and
their actual exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that
the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized.8 6
This reasoning leads to the conclusion that justification for a position can come
from considerations of strategy in the ensuing negotiations as well as simply
considerations of sound business practice.87 This, as well as a purely moral or
ethical reason,88 is more difficult to determine than the business reason criterion
and, as a result, the determination becomes more of a problem.
The courts' basic fear of empty bargaining was expressed in NLRB v. Reed &
Prince Manufacturing Co.89 when the court tried to reconcile the conflict of
policies in the Act by saying: "[I]t seems clear that if the Board is not to be
blinded by empty talk and by the mere surface motions of collective bargaining,
it must take some cognizance of the reasonableness of the positions taken by an
employer in the course of bargaining negotiations.1' 9° Since there are more than
business reasons for refusing a checkoff clause and since these other reasons are
more difficult to determine, a reasonableness test would seem to be more appro-
priate. Such a test necessarily requires an inquiry into the subjective intentions
of the parties.
D. Subjective Intentions and Good Faith
The Supreme Court has said that for the Court to infer good faith, it must
rely on the party's state of mind.91 This reliance on subjective intent is found
in the lower court opinions to varying degrees.92 The task of determining the
904 (1968). See also NLRB v. Century Cement Mfg. Co., 208 F.2d 84, 86 (2d Cir. 1953);
NLRB v. Niles-Bement-Pond Co., 199 F.2d 713, 715 (2d Cir. 1952).
84. See note 67 supra.
85. 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
86. Id. at 488-89. See also H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 110 (1970).
87. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 110 (1970) (dissenting opinion);
United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works) v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846, 856-57
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 US. 904 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
88. See NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 231 (Sth Cir. 1960).
89. 205 F.2d 131 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887 (1953).
90. Id. at 134 (emphasis added). See also Wilson & Co. v. NLRB, 115 F.2d 759, 763
(8th Cir. 1940); Smith, The Evolution of the '"Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law,
39 Mich. L. Rev. 1065 (1941).
91. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co, 351 U.S. 149, 155 (1956) (concurring opinion).
92. NLRE v. Wonder State Mfg. Co., 344 F.2d 210, 216 (8th Cir. 1965), citing NLRB v.
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motives of the parties belongs to the NLRB,93 but the Board's reasoning is
sometimes questioned by the courts. 94 A determination of the Board which has
gained wide acceptance by the courts is that the employer's firmness was in-
tended to frustrate the agreement or to destroy the union and thus results in an
unfair labor practice. 5 The question then becomes, can a refusal of a proposal
such as checkoff be construed as intending to frustrate an entire agreement or
bring about the destruction of a union?
In Specialty Container Corp.90 the employer refused a checkoff proposal
throughout the negotiations "explaining that it desired neither to harm nor to
assist the union, that it did not wish to know which employees were union mem-
bers, and that it wished to avoid disputes and disagreements which might arise
out of the checkoff."0 7 The majority found "there was no independent evidence
of hostility to the union, the employer's proposals were not illegal in their very
nature, nor were the employer's positions so indefensible or lacking in rationality
as to warrant an inference of bad faith."9 8 In American Oil Co.9 the employer
refused checkoff because it did not want to take any action which could be
construed as favoring unionism. Finding good faith, the Board felt the employ-
er's willingness to make concessions in other areas negated any inference that
the checkoff refusal was intended to frustrate agreement.100
However, the Board has also held that the refusal to grant checkoff does indi-
cate bad faith bargaining. In Stevenson Brick and Block Co.101 the Board
emphasized that there is no requirement that an employer capitulate to a de-
W.R. Hall Distrib., 341 F.2d 359, 362 (10th Cir. 1965) (delay, cooperation, preparation
for discussion, and reasonableness of demands are factors to be considered); NLRB v.
Almeida Bus Lines, Inc., 333 F.2d 729, 731 (1st Cir. 1964) (consideration of all "subtle
and elusive factors"); NLRB v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F.2d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 1960)
(sophistication and finesse in bargaining should not conceal bad faith) ; Singer Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 119 F.2d 131, 134 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) (trier of fact must
determine whether intentions are in good faith); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921,
924 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 314 U.S. 512 (1942) (length of time In
negotiations and persistence of employer in offering opportunities for agreement are Important
factors).
93. American Fed'n of T.V. & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 629 (D.C. Cir.
1968).
94. See United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works) v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846,
852 n.11 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); Id. at 857 (dissenting opinion).
95. Caroline Farms Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 205, 211 (4th Cir. 1968);
United Steelworkers (Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works) v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968); United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 363
F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra); NLRB v.
Generac Corp., 354 F.2d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1965).
96. 171 N.L.R.B. No. 6 (April 24, 1968).
97. 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. f" 22,413, at 29,557.
98. Id. Member Brown, in his dissent, found such actions as intending to frustrate
agreement. Id. at 29,558.
99. 164 N.L.R.B. 36 (1967).
100. Id. at 39. See also United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 363 F.2d
272, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra).
101. 160 N.L.R.B. 198 (1966), modified, 393 F.2d 234 (4th Cir. 1968).
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mand for checkoff but that the statutory right could not be used to conceal an
intent to frustrate agreement.102 In Flowers Baking Co. 10 3 the employer with-
stood a strike by his employees and evinced an intention to maintain his position
because the union had already fired its "big gun." The Board described this
attitude as intended to make bargaining futile and "to disparage the union and
undermine its position."'104 Also, in Roanoke Iron & Bridge Works, Inc.'05 the
Board, holding that ascertainment of good faith should depend on whether posi-
tions were taken for the purpose of frustrating agreement, said, "When an em-
ployer takes a position in bargaining, not to advance his own economic interest
or to safeguard the rights or interests of his employees, but for the purpose of
damaging or destroying the union with which he is bargaining, then he is not
bargaining in good faith." 06
Determining a consistent standard used by the Board in finding bad faith is a
near impossibility. Some help may be gained by a comparison of H. K. Porter
Co.10 7 with General Asbestos & Rubber Division, Raybestos-Manhattan Inc.03
In Porter the Board found that the refusal of checkoff had no reasonable basis
whatsoever and was maintained merely to frustrate agreement and undermine
the union. In Raybestos, the employer made it clear that he did not want a
checkoff clause in the bargaining agreement and the union, relying on Porter,
accused him of trying to destroy the union. Taking full cognizance of the Porter
case, the Board refused to find an unfair labor practice, holding, "The facts do
not suggest that the employer had any intention whatsoever of undermining the
union or of avoiding entering into a contract with it. Had there been no impasse
as to the dues-checkoff clause, a contract between the parties would have long
since been executed."'0 9 Is this a possible criterion? It seems that if an employer
would have long ago entered into an agreement had it not been for the impasse
as to checkoff he is not attempting to frustrate agreement. And if the union is
not a fledgling one whose existence depends on a checkoff provision, the employer
certainly cannot be accused of attempting to undermine the union-too many
other motives exist: business reasons, bargaining reasons, moral and ethical
reasons. From the myriad of fact situations which deal with checkoff it is hard
to determine whether the Board consistently based its decision on whether
agreement would have been reached had it not been for this one subject, but it
certainly can be so argued. Since the Act portends to encourage voluntary agree-
ments and subjective intentions seem to be the single most important factor in
determining good faith, such a standard would be a good one in attempting to
102. Id. at 210.
103. 169 N.L.R.B. No. 101 (Feb. 20, 1968), 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. UI 22,131, at
29,141, enforced, 418 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1969).
104. 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. ff 22,131, at 29,142.
105. 160 N.L.R.B. 175 (1966), enforced, 390 F.2d 846 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 391 US.
904 (1968).
106. Id. at 181 (emphasis added). The Board repeated that "hostility to, opposition to,
or strong reluctance to grant, [a] checkoff do not of themselves establish refusal to bargain
in good faith." Id. at 180.
107. 153 N.L.R.B. 1370 (1965) (for subsequent history see note 35 supra).
108. 168 N.L.R.. No. 54 (Nov. 27, 1967), 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. U 21,933.
109. 1968-1 CCH NLRB Dec. 1 21,933, at 28,794 (emphasis added).
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resolve the conflict in the Act. What still remains is the remedy to be used
where an unfair labor practice is found to exist.
IV. BoARD REEDIES
Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act is devoted to the prevention
of unfair labor practices. Section 10(c) contains the actual remedial powers of
the Board which include an order requiring the person committing the unfair
labor practice "to cease and desist from such . . . practice, and to take such
affirmative action ... as will effectuate the policies of [the Act] ... "110 Where
an employer is found guilty of bad faith bargaining because he has refused
checkoff with the purpose of frustrating any agreement, he is guilty of refusing
to bargain, an unfair labor practice under section 8(a) (5). nl1 The problem
arises when the employer is ordered to cease and desist from refusing to bargain
in good faith or is affirmatively ordered to bargain collectively. The employer
who persists in refusing to grant the dues checkoff, although agreeing to
bargain on the matter further, is oftentimes still found guilty of an unfair labor
practice by the Board. Yet the employer may again refuse to agree to the dues
checkoff. What effective remedy can the Board apply for this continuous refusal?
The overwhelming majority of courts agree that the Act prohibits the Board
from compelling either party to agree to substantive terms of an agreement.11 2
However, as noted, the Act also has the expressed policy of encouraging collec-
tive bargaining.113 Where an employer refuses to accept a term simply to
frustrate agreement and still refuses after being ordered to bargain, a tension
between these two policies exists.'1 4 If the Board cannot order the employer to
accept the checkoff it must rely on contempt proceedings to force the employer
to capitulate.
The interpretation of "affirmative relief" given the Act by the courts has been
liberal. The emphasis has been on the phrase "to effectuate the policies of this
Act." Thus, as long as the remedy devised by the Board is intended to effectuate
the Act's policies it has been deemed proper.1 5 However, this power is also
110. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964) (emphasis added).
111. Id. § 158(a)(5).
112. Id. § 158(d). See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 485-87
(1960); NLRB v. American Natl Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 404 (1952); Retail Clerks Int'l
Ass'n v. NLRB, 373 F.2d 655, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1967); NLRB v. American Aggregate Co.,
335 F.2d 253, 254-55 (5th Cir. 1964); NLRB v. H.E. Fletcher Co., 298 F.2d $94, 602
(1st Cir. 1962); NLRB v. P. Lorillard Co., 117 F.2d 921, 923-24 (6th Cir. 1941), rev'd on
other grounds, 314 US. 512 (1942). See also NLRB v. Gulf Power Co., 384 F.2d 822, 825
(Sth Cir. 1967); NLRB v. American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 80 (5th Cir. 1965); United States
Steel Corp. v. Nichols, 229 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 950 (1956);
Texas Foundaries, Inc. v. NLRB, 211 F.2d 791, 794 (5th Cir. 1954); NLRB v. Knoxville
Publ. Co., 124 F.2d 875, 881 (6th Cir. 1942); Jeffery-DeWitt Insulator Co. v. NLRB, 91
F.2d 134, 139 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 731 (1937).
113. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1964).
114. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960).
115. Franks Bros. Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 702, 704 (1944); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v.
NLRB, 319 US. 533, 539-41 (1943); NLRB v. Bush Hog, Inc., 40S F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir.
1968). For cases where the Board's remedy was deemed improper as not effectuating the
policies of the Act, see Carpenters Local 60 v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 651, 655 (1961); NLRB v.
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limited by the "very policies of the Act which the Board invokes.""10 In addition
it is to be a remedy, not a punishment,17 and must be "adapted to the situation
which calls for redress.""l 8 Because this affirmative relief is remedial and not
punitive, its object is to restore the status quo so the imbalance created by the
violation will be righted. 119
In the face of these precedents but feeling that justice could be served only by
ignoring them, the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the right of the Board
to order an employer to accept a checkoff proposal in United Steelworkers (H. K.
Porter Co.) v. NLRB. 20 In this case employer, H. K. Porter Co., objected to a
checkoff proposal because it did not want to aid and comfort the union. The
NLRB felt the employer's firmness on this subject was for the purpose of
frustrating the agreement and found bad faith.' 2 1 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia upheld this decision 22 and ordered the company to bar-
gain. When bargaining resumed the company offered alternatives but still no
checkoff. The union's petition for a clarification of the court's 1966 opinion was
denied, contempt proceedings being suggested. However, the Regional Director
of the Board declined to prosecute contempt proceedings,' - feeling that the
company had complied with the bargaining order. The union then filed a motion
for reconsideration of its earlier motion for clarification. The court granted the
motion and said:
We do not read Section 8(d) as prohibiting the Board from ordering a company, which
has repeatedly flouted its Section 8(a) (5) duty ... to make a concession where ...
such a concession would be the only way for the company to purge the stain of bad
faith that has already soiled its position. In certain cases such action by the company
may be the only means of assuring the Board, and the court, that it no longer harbors
an illegal intent.124
Repeating that an employer is entitled to remain adamant on a subject provided
such firmness is in good faith, the court still felt bad faith firmness could not be
tolerated and that "[w] here... two policies of the Act conflict, the Board must
seek to devise remedies which will best effectuate the one at least cost to the
Dist. 50, UMW, 355 U.S. 453, 458 (1958); NLRB v. Fansteel Metal. Corp., 306 U.S. 240,
257 (1939).
116. NLRB v. Fansteel Metal. Corp., 306 US. 240, 257 (1939).
117. NLRB v. Seven-Up Bot. Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10-11 (1940); Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 US. 197, 235-36
(1938); Decaturville Sportwear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1969); Textile
Workers Union v. NLRB, 388 F.2d 896, 906 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 US. 836
(1968); Local 57, ILGWU v. NLRB, 374 F.2d 295, 303 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 387 US.
942 (1967).
118. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 348 (1938); see NLRB v.
American Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 74, 80-81 (5th Cir. 1965).
119. Decaturvlle Sportswear Co. v. NLRB, 406 F.2d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1969).
120. 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra).
121. See note 34 supra.
122. 363 F.2d 272 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
123. Under the Act, only the Board, and not the individual, has the power to enforce
an order. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
124. United Steelworkers (H.X. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 389 F.2d 295, 299 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (emphasis added) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra).
1970]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39
other.' 125 The Board then ordered the company to accept the checkoff pro-
posal.126 The court of appeals upheld this order.12 7
The Supreme Court, however, reversed the District of Columbia Circuit, thus
rejecting this unique remedy.128 The Court agreed that the present remedial
powers of the Board may not be sufficiently broad to cope with all labor prob-
lems, but that "it is the job of Congress, not the Board or the courts, to decide
when and if it is necessary to allow governmental review of proposals for col-
lective-bargaining agreements and compulsory submission to one side's de-
mand."' 29 Justice Black, writing for the majority, said the hope and purpose of
the NLRA was to achieve mutual agreement and to avoid industrial strife.
But the Act as presently drawn does not contemplate that unions will always be
secure and able to achieve agreement even when their economic position is weak, or
that strikes and lockouts will never result from a bargaining impasse. It cannot be said
that the Act forbids an employer or a union to rely ultimately on its economic strength
to try to secure what it cannot obtain through bargaining.130
Thus the Court held there can be no judicial compulsion to agree to a sub-
stantive term for any reason whatsoever under the Act as presently drawn.
V. CONCLUSION
In the course of union-management negotiations it is apparent that the sub-
ject of dues checkoff must be bargained for if the union so desires.18 ' The Board
and courts have based this finding on section 8(d) of the Act which requires
mandatory bargaining of "conditions of employment." 1 2 In the strict sense of
the word, dues checkoff is a condition of employment. Section 8(a) (3) of the
Act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage
125. Id. at 301. See Ross, Analysis of Administrative Process Under Taft-Hartley,
63 Lab. Rel. Rep. 132, 133 (1966). The court based its holding on the Inadequacy of
previous Board remedial efforts and testimony before the House Special Subcommittee on
Labor in which witnesses testified that a refusal to bargain in good faith Is a frequent last
resort to undermine the union. 389 F.2d at 302.
126. H.K. Porter Co., 172 N.L.R.B. No. 72 (July 3, 1968), 1968-2 CCH NLRB Dec.
fI 20,040 (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra). The Board's order read: "As
Respondent has repeatedly violated Section 8(a) (5) and admittedly had no business reason
for opposing the checkoff, and as its only reason for such opposition was to frustrate agree-
ment with the Union, we conclude, in accordance with the Court's rationale, that an order
to grant checkoff is warranted in the circumstances of this case. To permit Respondent to
hold out for some 'reasonable concession' by the Union in return for the checkoff requirement
would imply that the Respondent is now being ordered to surrender a position that it had
legitimately maintained." Id. at 25,115.
127. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
128. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
129. Id. at 109.
130. Id. Justice Douglas, dissenting, felt the Board should be given the power to compel
agreement where there is a clear avoidance of agreement, "[blut once there is any business
consideration that leads to a denial of a demand or any consideration of bargaining
strategy that explains the refusal, the Board has no power to act." Id. at 110-11 (dissenting
opinion).
131. See notes 42, 48 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
132. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964).
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membership in any labor organization provided "[t]hat nothing in this [Act] ...
shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organiza-
tion... to require as a condition of employment membership therein .... ."m
Thus membership in a union is most certainly a condition of employment. Pay-
ment of dues, on the same hand, is a condition of membership in the union.
Section 8(a) (3) also provides that an employer may not discriminate against
an employee for nonmembership in the union "for reasons other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues .... "134 Dues checkoff, as stated
earlier,135 facilitates the collection of dues for the union. Thus, the logical de-
duction can be made that since union membership is a condition of employment
and dues payment is a condition of membership, that the facilitation of dues
payment by the checkoff procedure would make that procedure a condition of
employment. However, in reaching this determination the statute might perhaps
have been stretched. Almost any decision made or action taken by management
will affect the conditions under which its employees work. 30 Some cognizance
must be taken of the fact that an employer has a right to run his business as he
sees fit. 37 Dues checkoff is an administrative burden, no matter how large or
how small, which management is forced to negotiate because it is an "indirect"
condition of employment. 38 Nonetheless, the Board and courts, faced with the
opportunity of strengthening the concept of management's rights or widening
the area of employees' conditions of employment, have chosen the latter.
During the bargaining sessions themselves good faith is the watchword. The
concept of good faith is such a complex one that it has necessarily caused prob-
lems for the Board and courts.13 9 Until both management and labor are given a
standard which is readily discernable, inconsistencies in decisions 40 will only
hinder effective collective bargaining. On the other hand the subjective nature
of good faith precludes the formation of concrete guidelines.' 4' Perhaps the best
guideline for decisions in this area was laid down by the Board in the Ray-
bestos142 case. There an impasse as to one subject did not preclude good faith
bargaining because without the impasse an agreement would have been reached. 14
The entire agreement must be the focal point if an intelligible standard is to be
133. Id. § 158(a) (3).
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
136. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 387 F.2d 542, 548 (4th Cir. 1967).
137. See notes 31-32 supra and accompanying text.
138. Section 8(a) (3) calls for discharge for failure to tender dues. See note 133 supra.
The theory that checkoff is a condition of employment revolves around the proposition that
an employee can be fired for failing to tender his dues. It becomes less of a condition the
easier it is for the employee to be able to tender these dues, Le., a local union office,
facilities in the plant for union collection of union dues. Thus the more organized the union
is, the easier it is for it to collect dues, and the less relevant to the worker's conditions of
employment dues checkoff becomes.
139. See text following note 68 supra.
140. Id.
141. See text accompanying note 91 supra.




set up. When the Board and courts emphasize one subject as being bargained
in bad faith they are defeating the purpose of the Act. 1 "4 If a contract could
have been executed but for the one subject, good faith should be found. And if
the subject is of such importance to a party the recourse should be to economic
weapons,145 not to the courts. But at all times the Board and courts must keep
in mind the totality of the bargaining agreement, not its individual parts.140
When a determination of bad faith has finally been made, the Board must
fashion its remedies within the framework of the Act. If a refusal to bargain
the subject of dues checkoff has been found to be a bad faith refusal and thus
an unfair labor practice, the Board can order the employer to "cease and desist"
from such bad faith bargaining and "take such affirmative action . . . as will
effectuate the policies of [the Act] .... '147 The ordering of a party to accept
a dues checkoff proposal is in direct opposition to section 8(d) 148 and thus does
not effectuate the Act's policies. The stubborn employer who obeys an order to
bargain but who continues to refuse the checkoff after bargaining the matter
further may still have complied with the Act. 149 On the other hand, if the refusal
is again found to be in bad faith, the Board can enforce its order through the
courts' 50 which can hold a recalcitrant employer in contempt for further refusals
to comply with the order. Devising an affirmative remedy which will force the
employer to bargain in good faith without infringing on the employer's freedom
of contract is a difficult if not impossible task. In any area of the law one can
find those who persist in evading the law. To find a new remedy for the re-
calcitrant employer bent on frustrating any attempts at collective bargaining
would seem to require a basic change in our country's policies on labor-manage-
ment relations.' 6 ' However, to enforce our present policies as enunciated in the
Act, contempt proceedings are adequate.152 The employer who persists in at-
tempting to foil the process of collective bargaining will either capitulate or
suffer the punitive effects of a contempt order. On the other hand, the employer
who sincerely desires to reach an agreement but who is firm on the issue of dues
checkoff will have the opportunity of using a different bargaining approach
which would satisfy the Act.153 This is in keeping with the Act's objective of
sincere collective bargaining in good faith while still allowing the parties to
make their own agreement.
144. See note 67 supra.
145. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
146. See note 67 supra.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964).
148. See note 12 supra.
149. Such was the case in United Steelworkers (H.K. Porter Co.) v. NLRB, 389 F.2d
295, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (for prior and subsequent history see note 35 supra) where the
Regional Director found the employer had bargained in good faith but the court ignored
this finding. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964).
151. See notes 127-29 supra and accompanying text.
152. See NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226, 233 (1949) where the Court
referred to the "swift retribution of contempt.'
153. See note 124 supra and accompanying text. There the employer's bargaining after
the Board order was found by the Regional Director to be in good faith.
